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WRONGFUL DEATH: DOES THE NCAA HAVE 







As of 2018, there were 1,036,842 participants in high school football, and 
many of those players dreamed of becoming a collegiate athlete or even 
becoming a professional football player.1  Of those participants, only 73,557 
participants or an estimated 6.9 percent proceed to play football at a college 
level, and only 1.6 percent of college football players can achieve their dream 
of competing on a professional level.2  For many young football players, college 
is a step to their future; it is a necessary step to becoming one of the lucky few.  
It was at the collegiate level that Jordan McNair was working to be the best that 
he could be; it was at this level that McNair’s journey abruptly and tragically 
ended. Due to decisions made by staff at the University of Maryland 
(Maryland), a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) member-
institution, McNair suffered from exertional heat stroke during a conditioning 
session and tragically died.3  Thus, McNair’s family has sought legal remedy 
for the actions of both the football coaching staff and the university; however, 
the question of whether the NCAA should also be held liable for the actions of 
its member-institution needs answering. 
 
 Rae-Anna Sollestre was the 2019–20 Sources Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review and received 
a Juris Doctor from Marquette University Law School and a Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports 
Law Institute in May 2020.  Sollestre would like to thank the members of the Marquette Sports Law Review 
and her fellow Editorial Board Members for all of their hard work. 
1. Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA.ORG (Apr. 3, 2019), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics. 
2. Id.  
3. Rick Maese & Roman Stubbs, U-Md. Releases Report on Jordan McNair, Laying Out Timeline that 
Led to Player’s Death, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/u-md-
board-of-regents-releases-report-on-jordan-mcnair-laying-out-timeline-that-led-to-players-
death/2018/09/21/49331ea0-bda9-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html?utm_term=.2551803bc86e.  
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Part II of this Comment will discuss the facts of the McNair case to provide 
the background of this issue and information regarding heat stroke and wrongful 
death in athletics.  To properly assess potential NCAA liability, Part III will 
provide the legal authority including the choice of law and applicable wrongful 
death statutes focusing largely on Maryland4 and Indiana5 law.  Part IV will then 
assess whether the NCAA has a duty to protect the health and safety of student-
athletes and thus potentially be liable for McNair’s death in Maryland or 
Indiana.  This Comment will shed some light on why it is unlikely that the 
NCAA will be liable for the wrongful death of a student-death in Maryland or 
Indiana. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On May 29th, 2018, Jordan McNair, 19 years old,6 attended Maryland’s team 
conditioning session, which occurred after the team’s four-week break, at the 
practice field instead of the originally scheduled location, Maryland Stadium;7 
however, the session was held immediately after a team break indicating no 
acclimatization occurred.8  Acclimatization is defined as a gradual increase in 
practice intensity with modified work-to-rest-ratio,9 which did not occur.10  
Additionally, the sudden change from the Maryland Stadium to the practice 
fields did not allow enough time for the training staff to have a trauma bag or 
cold water immersion readily available.11 A trauma bag contains medical 
supplies including oxygen tanks and masks, AEDs, inhalers, and artificial 
airways,12 and cold water immersion utilizes ice and cold water to rapidly cool 
a person’s body temperature.13  
After the team flexibility and dynamic warmups took place, players ran in 
groups of ten for 110-yard runs, which were being monitored by the Head 
 
4. The McNair incident occurred in Maryland, so it would be possible for a claim to be filed in this state. 
5. The NCAA is located in Indiana; therefore, it may be possible for an Indiana court to have jurisdiction. 
6. Maese & Stubbs, supra note 3. 
7. WALTERS INC., AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS RELATED TO THE 
JUNE 2018 DEATH OF A UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND FOOTBALL STUDENT-ATHLETE 25–26 (2018), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4918313/Investigation-in-death-of-Maryland-football.pdf 
[hereinafter Independent Evaluation] (providing facts of the incident).  
8. Id. at 25. 
9. Id. at 6.  
10. Id. at 64 (suggesting encouragements and reminders to the student-athletes to follow their individual 
workout plan over the four-week break did not adequately indicate individual fitness). 
11. Id. at 26, 62. 
12. Id. at 10-11. 
13. NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, at 41 (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/MD15.pdf [hereinafter Sports Medicine Handbook]. 
SOLLESTRE – COMMENT 30.2 9/11/2020  10:32 PM 
2020]    AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT ATHLETES  395 
 
Football Athletic Trainer.14  McNair ran his first seven runs within the allotted 
time frame; however, during the last repetition, McNair struggled to finish and 
received medical attention from the athletic trainers on the field who noticed 
several heat exhaustion symptoms including back and heat cramps, fatigue, and 
low back pain.15  Thirty-four minutes passed between the time McNair first 
started exhibiting symptoms and his removal from the field, but the training staff 
never assessed or recorded McNair’s temperature or vital signs.16  Ice packs and 
ice towels were used in an attempt to cool him17 despite the availability of cold 
water immersion after he was moved to the training room.18  McNair’s health 
quickly deteriorated resulting in calling the team physician, 9-1-1, and campus 
security; however, due to inefficiencies and confusion (e.g., training staff’s 
failure to immediately call 9-1-1 at the onset of symptoms and notify campus 
security, and failure to meet emergency personnel), McNair did not arrive at the 
hospital until forty minutes later—about an hour and a half after he first 
presented symptoms.19 Upon arrival at the hospital, his temperature was 
recorded at 106 degrees Fahrenheit,20 which is above the exertional heat stroke 
symptom of a temperature over 105 degrees Fahrenheit.21  
As a result of these mistakes and inefficiencies, McNair died on June 13th 
as a result of heat stroke.22  Maryland’s football staff failed to supply the 
necessary and proper medical supplies, determine field temperature, and 
acclimatize athletes.23  Additionally, the death of McNair is considered a 
catastrophic event according to both the “University of Maryland Athletics 
Critical Incident” Guideline and the NCAA Manual requiring prompt 
documentation of the event, communication with the Critical Incident 
Management Team, and a detailed summary.24  Maryland admitted their football 
 
14. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 26-27 (recognizing that several players appeared fatigued). 
15. See id. at 28. 
16. Id. at 29-30. 
17. Id. at 64. 
18. Id. at 63. 
19. Id. at 31-32. 
20. Alex Kirshner, Jordan McNair’s Death: What We Know About Maryland and DJ Durkin’s Role, 
SBNATION (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/8/11/17678652/jordan-mcnair-
death-investigation-maryland. 
21. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 16. 
22. Kirshner, supra note 20. 
23. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 63–64. 
24. Id. at 18-19; NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 3, 3.2.4.19 at 12 (Aug. 1, 2018). 
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training and medical staff failed to diagnose and treat Jordan McNair’s 
exertional heat stroke, 25 and subsequently, Maryland fired its head coach.26 
Early recognition and treatment of exertional heat stroke is necessary to 
have the best chance at survival.27  Experts have determined the survival rate of 
exertional heat stroke is high.28 From 1960–2017, 145 heat stroke cases resulted 
in death connected to football practices alone.29 As a result, the Annual Survey 
of Football Injury—a survey prepared for the NCAA, the American Football 
Coaches Association, National Athletic Trainers’ Association30—urges a 
continuous effort to prevent heat stroke in football especially because most 
deaths occur during practice, not competition.31 Due to this knowledge, the 
NCAA and all of its member-institutions should be aware of both procedures 
and statistics regarding exertional heat stroke in football.  Therefore, because 
Maryland is an NCAA member-institution, it is appropriate to assess whether 
the failures by the University of Maryland’s staff to both diagnose and treat 
Jordan McNair could cause the NCAA to be liable for Maryland’s actions. 
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Due to the NCAA's knowledge of heat stroke-related deaths involving 
football players and the University of Maryland's failure to follow NCAA 
Manual principles, guidelines, and regulations, it is important to determine 
whether the NCAA can be liable for the wrongful death of athletes that have 
suffered from exertional heat stroke.32 The Manual requires active member 
institutions to report catastrophic sports injuries, which includes heat stroke, 
annually to the NCAA and requires student-athletes to complete an annual 
health and safety survey.33 Additionally, the NCAA produces a medical 
 
25. Rick Maese et al., Maryland Football Player Death: University of Maryland Apologizes to Jordan 
McNair’s Family, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/terrapins-
insider/wp/2018/08/14/university-of-maryland-apologizes-to-jordan-mcnair-family-for-mistakes-that-our-
training-staff-made/?utm_term=.bb8e19a84748. 
26. Heather Dinich & Darren Rovell, Maryland Terrapins Football Coach DJ Durkin Fired One Day 
After Reinstatement, ESPN, https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/25137549/maryland-terrapins-
coach-dj-durkin-fired-wake-probe?device=featurephone (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (Maryland’s President 
fired coach despite reinstatement of coach following placement on administrative leave).  
27. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 4, 6 (recommending aggressive treatment to lower body 
temperature within thirty minutes of symptom onset). 
28. KRISTEN L. KUCERA, ET AL., ANNUAL SURVEY OF FOOTBALL INJURY RESEARCH 14 (2018), 
https://nccsir.unc.edu/files/2013/10/Annual-Football-2017-Fatalities-FINAL.pdf. 
29. Id.  
30. Id. at i. 
31. Id. at 14. 
32. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3. 
33. Id. at art. 3, 3.2.4.19-3.2.4.20. 
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handbook, which has not been updated since 2014, consisting of guidelines—
not mandatory rules—for member-institutions to develop their own sports 
medicine policies according to best current practices.34 The NCAA only 
intended for the handbook to provide “guidelines for each institution for 
developing sports medicine policies appropriate for its intercollegiate athletics 
program . . . . In other words, these guidelines are not mandates. . . .”35 The 
member-institutions, not the NCAA, are responsible for the development and 
establishment of appropriate sports medicine policies according to the best 
practices.36 According to the Sports Medicine Handbook’s guidelines on 
exertional heat stroke, more deaths from heat stroke occurred from 2005–2009 
than any other period in the last thirty years, and it is the third leading cause of 
sudden deaths in athletes.37 Guideline 2C in the Sports Medicine Handbook 
provides the recommended practices to prevent exertional heat stroke including 
annual initial physical evaluations, previous heat strokes and their risk factors, 
gradual acclimatization, hydration status, and record of environmental 
conditions.38 
In the state of Maryland, a wrongful death action can commence against a 
person who causes another person’s death.39  The statute’s definition of “person” 
includes, but is not limited to, “individual[s], . . . fiduciar[ies], or 
representative[s] of any partnership, firm, association, public or private 
corporation, or any other entity.”40 Maryland permits a deceased’s parent to 
initiate a wrongful death action as long as the parent was not convicted of a 
crime under the relevant statute.41  This action must be filed within three years 
of the person’s death unless the death was caused by an “occupational disease” 
defined in the statute or criminal homicide under State or federal law caused the 
wrongful death.42  For a tortfeasor43 to be liable for the deceased’s injuries, the 
actual harm must be within the scope of danger that can be expected or 
 
34. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2. 
35. Id. 
36. Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 174 (D.D.C. 2017). 
37. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39; see also KUCERA, ET AL., supra note 28, at 15 
(requiring staff to know the temperature and humidity during practices and games because a we-bulb 
temperature at or above eighty-two degrees Fahrenheit is a risk factor for exertional heat stroke). 
38. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39-40. 
39. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902(a) (West 1974). 
40. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-901(d) (West 1983). 
41. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904(a) (West 2012). 
42. Id. at § 3-904(g). 
43. Tortfeasor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a tortfeasor as a person that commits 
a tortious act). 
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anticipated.44 When multiple negligent acts or omissions have occurred 
concerning the deceased's death, liability can be avoided should there be an 
intervening act or omission that is a "superseding cause" of the decedent’s 
harm.45  “Negligence by a subsequent actor breaks the chain of causation when 
the action by the subsequent actor is extraordinary and not reasonably 
foreseeable.”46 
Due to the NCAA’s headquarters being located in Indianapolis, Indiana, this 
wrongful death claim could also be attempted in Indiana.  In Indiana, a personal 
representative of a deceased person whose death was caused by another’s 
wrongful conduct is permitted to initiate a lawsuit against the latter if the 
deceased would have been able to initiate his own suit against the latter for 
injury for the same wrongful conduct.47  This action must be brought within two 
years of the deceased’s death.48  Additionally, Indiana permits wrongful death 
actions against corporate entities.49 
Torts, like wrongful death, are governed differently depending on the state’s 
“choice of law."50  On the one hand, many states like Maryland follow the First 
Restatement's traditional test, which governs almost all tort issues,51 providing 
that torts are governed within the state that “the last event necessary to make an 
actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."52  On the other hand, other states like 
Indiana follow the Second Restatement’s significant relationship test.53  This 
test considers “(1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2) 
the residence and place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and 
(3) the place where the parties’ relationship is centered.”54 
In this case, the University of Maryland, an NCAA member-institution, 
already admitted its fault for the role it played in the premature death of Jordan 
 
44. Copsey v. Park, 160 A.3d 623, 637 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017). 
45. Id.  
46. Id. at 639. 
47. IND. CODE § 34-23-1-1(1) (1998). 
48. Id.  
49. See 12 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317 (2018). 
50. See Jed J. Borghei, Note, Class Action Fairness: A Mature Solution to the 23(B)(3) Choice of Law 
Problem, 95 GEO. L.J. 1645, 1647 (2007). 
51. Id.  
52. Id. (citing Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws § 377 (Am. Law Inst. 1934)); see Richards v. U.S., 
369 U.S. 1, 16 (1962) (providing the applicable law in wrongful death is generally where the act occurred); 
see also Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co., 832 N.W.2d 133, 138–139  (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (precluding wrongful 
death actions taking place outside of Wisconsin state lines). 
53. See Borghei, supra note 50, at 1647. 
54. Simon v. U.S., 341 F.3d 193, 200 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
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McNair;55 therefore, it is undisputed that Maryland can be liable for the failures 
on the medical and training staffs’ part to properly diagnose and treat McNair.56  
However, there is still an issue of whether the NCAA could be liable through its 
member-institution for the death of McNair. 
IV. NCAA’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR THE DEATH OF JORDAN MCNAIR 
A. NCAA and the Health and Safety of Student-Athletes 
To address potential liability, it is important to first address whether the 
NCAA has a duty to keep its student-athletes safe.  “A duty of care may . . . 
arise where [a supervising entity] assumes such a duty, either gratuitously or 
voluntarily.”57  The assumed duty must arise out of enough specific, affirmative 
action to constitute voluntarily undertaking the duty.58  Once this duty is 
assumed, the imposition of liability incurs only when the supervising entity fails 
to act reasonably,59 but promises and guidelines are not sufficient to indicate the 
entity actually oversaw and controlled the other entity.60  When a supervising 
entity provides guidelines for alleged wrongdoing, the supervising entity is not 
liable for any subordinate entity’s conduct outside of the provided guidelines61 
because an entity’s provision of guidelines is not indicative of any control or 
oversight.62  Thus, it is unlikely that a court would find the NCAA has an 
affirmative duty to protect its student-athletes’ health and safety because the 
NCAA never voluntarily assumed the duty to protect its student-athletes. 
A voluntary undertaking of a duty cannot be supported by broad 
generalizations.63  McCants v. National Collegiate Athletic Association was 
brought as a part of a class action suit against both the NCAA and one of its 
member-institutions, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill alleging 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.64  The plaintiffs alleged the NCAA 
had undertaken the voluntary duty to protect the education and educational 
 
55. Maese & Stubbs, supra note 3. 
56. Id. 
57. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Yost v. 
Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Ind. 2014)). 
58. McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding broad, 
generalized declarations are insufficient to prove voluntary undertaking of a duty). 
59. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 550. 
60. Yost v. Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 519 (Ind. 2014); see also McCants, 201 F. Supp.3d at 743. 
61. See Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 519. 
62. See Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 174 (D.D.C. 2017). 
63. McCants, 201 F. Supp.3d at 740. 
64. Id. at 736. 
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opportunities of student-athletes65 and utilized the NCAA’s governing 
documents and statements made to the public through public representations in 
their attempt to illustrate that the NCAA owed a duty to the plaintiffs to provide 
“academically sound” educational opportunities to student-athletes.66  However, 
the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because there was no proof the NCAA 
had a legal duty to protect student-athletes’ education resulting from a voluntary 
undertaking.67  The court found the assertions made by the NCAA were not 
specific enough to either the NCAA or the plaintiffs.68  Additionally, the court 
elaborated and determined that an activity’s regulation is not equivalent to 
engaging or controlling that activity; therefore, it would not be appropriate to 
find the supervising entity to be voluntarily undertaking that duty.69 
Because the NCAA has not voluntarily undertaken the duty to protect 
student-athletes, it is unlikely that a court would find the NCAA has a duty to 
protect its student-athletes. Like in McCants where the plaintiff relied upon the 
NCAA’s governing documents in its attempt to illustrate the NCAA voluntarily 
asserted a duty to protect the educational opportunities of its student-athletes,70 
it is likely that the plaintiff, in this case, would rely upon both the NCAA Manual 
and the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook to show that the NCAA has a duty 
to protect the health and safety of student-athletes. However, comparable to 
McCants where the court found the basis of the plaintiff’s assertion to be 
insufficient to constitute a voluntary undertaking by the NCAA,71 a court would 
also likely find, in the McNair case, the use of the Manual and the Handbook to 
be inadequate to support the claim that the NCAA had a duty to protect student-
athlete health and safety created from a voluntary undertaking because the 
Manual and the Handbook were meant to be guidelines—not regulations.    
Therefore, the broad generalizations made in NCAA governing documents 
regarding exertional heat stroke do not support the claim that the NCAA 
affirmatively and voluntarily asserted the duty to protect its student-athletes. 
The provision of exertional heat stroke prevention and treatment in the 
NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook only serves as guidelines, not mandatory 
rules; 72 therefore, the NCAA did not affirmatively undertake the duty to protect 
 
65. Id. at 738. 
66. Id. at 740–41. 
67. Id. at 742 (finding even if the NCAA made promises to provide education to student-athletes, those 
promises would not constitute a voluntarily undertaking). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 745. 
70. Id. at 741. 
71. Id. at 744. 
72. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
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its student-athletes.73 In Lanni v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the 
plaintiff fenced as a student-athlete at an NCAA member-institution competing 
in a competition.74  After her competition, the plaintiff was struck in the eye 
while she was within the designated waiting area resulting in severe injury.75  
Hence, the plaintiff filed suit claiming the NCAA breached its duty to both her 
and other student-athletes.76  After the plaintiff’s injury, the NCAA and its 
Fencing Committee discussed the issues regarding the current layout of fencing 
competitions and determined that the fencing strips were too close to each 
other.77  Even so, the court concluded the NCAA owed no duties to student-
athlete health and safety because the NCAA did not act in any way to indicate 
it had a duty to supervise or control its member-institutions.78  
While it is “commendable” for the NCAA to want to be actively involved 
in their member-institutions provision of safety of student-athletes,79 a 
supervising entity providing guidelines and expressing disapproval for the 
alleged wrongdoing is not liable for their subordinate’s conduct done outside of 
the guidelines.80  The duty of care can result from “affirmative, deliberate 
conduct”81 on the actor’s part to assume such a duty of care to perform the task 
at issue, but the plaintiff failed to illustrate the affirmative action necessary to 
prove the NCAA was responsible for member-institution oversight, directly or 
indirectly, regarding student-athlete safety.82  The evidence proved the NCAA 
only has duties to provide information and guidance to member-institutions and 
their student-athletes regarding the safety of student-athletes.83  While 
compliance checks occur at member-institutions by the NCAA, “[a]ctual 
oversight and control cannot be imputed merely from the fact that the NCAA 
has promulgated rules and regulations and required compliance with” them.84 
The NCAA’s provision of guidelines and regulations is not sufficient to 
prove it owed student-athletes like Jordan McNair a duty to protect their health 
and safety.85  Unlike Lanni where the NCAA inspected the competition site 
 
73. Id. at 550. 
74. Id. at 546. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 548. 
77. Id. at 553. 
78. Id.  
79. Id. 
80. See id. at 550. 
81. Id. at 550. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 553. 
84. Id.  
85. Id.  
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before the plaintiff's injury,86 the NCAA did not inspect the conditioning site 
before McNair's exertional heat stroke, which resulted in his untimely death.  
However, similarly to Lanni where the NCAA has provided regulations to 
protect student-athletes in fencing competitions,87 the NCAA, in this case, has 
also produced a Sports Medicine Handbook to provide guidelines to prevent and 
treat exertional heat stroke.  The NCAA’s provision of guidance regarding 
exertional heat stroke is not indicative of the NCAA having a duty to its student-
athletes’ health and safety, like in Lanni where the court determined the NCAA 
only had a duty to provide information and guidance regarding the health and 
safety of student-athletes.88  Additionally, comparable to the court in Lanni’s 
determination that actual oversight and control results from conduct to 
affirmatively assume that duty,89 the NCAA, in this case, has not affirmatively 
assumed the duty to provide actual oversight and control over the health and 
safety of its student-athletes due to both statements in the NCAA Manual and 
the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook.90  Because the NCAA has not 
affirmatively undertaken the duty to protect its student-athletes and only 
provides guidelines for exertional health and safety, the NCAA duty to student-
athlete health and safety exists only to the extent of providing information and 
guidelines to member-institutions regarding health and safety. 
At times, medical decisions are necessary to protect the health and safety of 
student-athletes, but those decisions are not subject to NCAA control and 
oversight.91  The plaintiff, in Bradley v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, was a student-athlete playing field hockey at a member-institution 
who was hit in the head during a game and suffered concussion symptoms; 
however, she was not advised to refrain from practicing or playing whilst 
experiencing symptoms.92  Because she was not told to sit out, she continued 
playing and practicing in field hockey games.93  Plaintiff asserted the “NCAA 
undertook and assumed a duty to protect the physical and mental well-being of 
all student-athletes participating in intercollegiate sports . . . [and] a duty to 
 
86. Id.  
87. See id. 
88. Id.  
89. Id. 
90. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3 (placing the responsibility of student-athlete health and safety 
on NCAA member-institutions); SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2 (providing only guidance 
and recommendations, not "rigid requirements" for member-institutions to create their own rules for student-
athlete medical safety).  
91. See Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 173 (D.D.C. 2017).  
92. Id. at 156–57. 
93. Id. at 157. 
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protect student-athletes from brain injuries.”94  The court found the Sports 
Medicine Handbook produced by the NCAA only provided general guidance, 
and it was up to the member-institutions to establish their own sports medicine 
policies for their student-athletes.95 This handbook did not establish a standard 
of care but deferred sports medicine policies to the member-institutions to 
develop.96  Furthermore, the NCAA could not discipline universities for the 
failure to adhere to NCAA purposes and policies and in that same vein, the 
NCAA has no right to control or direct treatment of student-athletes by 
healthcare providers at the member-institution.97  
The provision of guidelines for medical treatment by a supervising entity 
does not give the entity a right to control those decisions.98  Unlike in Bradley, 
where it is unclear whether medical or training staff checked on the plaintiff to 
determine if she was "play ready," Jordan McNair was treated by training staff 
when initial symptoms occurred.99  However, similar to the Bradley court’s 
finding that the NCAA is only responsible for providing member-institution 
guidance,100 the only duty owed to student-athletes like Jordan from the NCAA 
is to provide informative guidance to member-institutions about exertional heat 
stroke prevention.  Comparable to Bradley where the NCAA provided 
concussion recommendations and guidelines in the Sports Medicine 
Handbook,101 exertional heat stroke risk factors, prevention, and treatment 
guidelines were also provided in that same handbook by the NCAA.102  Thus, 
the duty to provide member-institutions was fulfilled in this case.  A court is 
likely to find the guidelines provided to Maryland and the other member-
institutions by the NCAA could not support the idea that the NCAA voluntarily 
undertook the duty of health and safety, analogous to Bradley where the court 
found the rules the NCAA implemented for member-institutions regarding 
concussion protocol to be insufficient to prove that the NCAA was actually 
involved or actively controlling concussion protocols at their member-
institutions.103  Additionally, the court in Bradley held the NCAA has no control 
over how a member-institution’s health care providers treat student-athletes,104 
 
94. Id. at 168. 
95. Id. at 174. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id.  
99. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 27-32. 
100. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 174. 
101. Id.  
102. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39. 
103. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 168. 
104. Id. at 174. 
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so the NCAA should not be responsible for the medical decisions of Maryland’s 
training staff in the treatment of Jordan McNair because the guidelines provided 
in the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook are mere recommendations for NCAA 
member-institutions to craft their own policies fulfilling the only duty of the 
NCAA to student-athlete health and safety. 
For the NCAA to be liable for the Jordan McNair’s death, an assessment of 
whether the NCAA has a duty to protect the health and safety of student-athletes 
is necessary, which can result from specific affirmative conduct.105  The 
provision of guidelines by the supervising entity is insufficient to prove that the 
supervising entity was in control or oversaw compliance with those 
guidelines.106  It is unlikely that a court will find the NCAA owed an affirmative 
duty to protect student-athlete safety because the guidelines regarding exertional 
heat stroke are not indicative of the NCAA’s control or oversight of those 
guidelines—including directing or controlling medical treatment—and simply 
providing guidelines cannot support a claim of an affirmative duty. 
B. Liability in Maryland 
Because the harm inflicted upon Jordan McNair occurred in the state of 
Maryland, the potential liability of the NCAA should first be assessed based on 
the application of Maryland law. In Maryland, a wrongful death action “may be 
maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another,”107 
which can be incurred against “an individual, . . . or any partnership, firm, 
association, public or private corporation or entity.”108  A wrongful act is 
defined as “an act, neglect, or default . . . . which would have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action and recover damages” if not for death.109  This 
definition requires a showing by the plaintiff that the wrongful act was a 
“proximate cause” of death.110  Additionally, it must be proven that the 
defendant’s alleged wrongful act more likely than not caused death.111  If the 
defendant has a duty to protect the deceased, the wrongful act done must 
 
105. McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 3d, 732, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
106. See Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 174. 
107. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902 (1974). 
108. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-901 (1983) (emphasis added). 
109. Id. 
110. Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 211 (Md. 1990) (discussing the defendant’s wrongful 
act does not need to be the only cause but should have contributed substantially to the injury); see Weimer v. 
Hetrick, 525 A.2d 643, 652 (Md. 1987) (finding it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prove under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard the defendant’s wrongful act proximately caused the death). 
111. Fennell, 580 A.2d at 211; Weimer, 525 A.2d at 652; See also State of Md. v. Manor Real Estate & 
Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying Maryland laws holding actual proof is required to 
prove that if not for the defendant's action, then the injury or death would not have occurred). 
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constitute negligence on the defendant's part and be a substantial part of the 
deceased's death.112 
Before the question of whether the NCAA can be liable for Jordan McNair’s 
death, a duty must exist for Maryland to protect its student-athletes’ health and 
safety.113  It has been established that a special relationship can create a duty 
when one party voluntarily undertakes that duty requiring the party to act as a 
reasonably prudent person,114 and many courts have found that universities’ 
special relationship with student-athletes require universities to “provide 
preventative measures in the event of a medical emergency.”115  Because of this, 
it is likely a court would find Maryland owed a duty to reasonably protect its 
student-athletes, which could be the basis of liability for wrongful death action. 
To assess whether the NCAA could be liable for the actions of Maryland, 
the doctrines of vicarious liability or respondeat superior must be assessed.  In 
Maryland, a corporate employer can be held liable for its employee’s tortious 
conduct when the employee acts within the scope of his or her employment.116  
Acts conducted to benefit the employer's business with authorization constitute 
within the scope of employment.117  Additionally, the duty of one party to 
protect the other should exist.118  In this case, the NCAA member-institutions 
are responsible for applying and enforcing the rules within the NCAA 
Manual.119  Among these rules, the member-institutions are responsible to 
protect the health and safety of their student-athletes.120  Therefore, because the 
Maryland training and medical staff did not properly diagnose and treat 
McNair’s exertional heat stroke, Maryland could potentially be liable for the 
 
112. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d at 418. 
113. See id. 
114. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
115. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3rd Cir. 1993); see Beckett v. Clinton Prairie 
Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind. 1987) (holding schools have a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable 
care for their student-athletes’ safety); see also Benitez v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 29 (N.Y. 1989) 
(finding when a student-athlete voluntarily participates in extracurricular athletics, schools owe a reasonable 
standard of care). 
116. Women First OB/GYN Assoc., L.L.C. v. Harris, 161 A.3d 28, 34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017); see 
also Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 418 (Md. 1883) (establishing agents’ commission of a 
tort can cause either separate or joint liability for the agents’ employer). 
117. S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (Md. 2003). 
118. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); see also State of 
Md. v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir. 1949). 
119. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 1, 1.3.2. 
120. Id. at art. 2, 2.2.3.  
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actions of their employees.121  Similarly, it would be possible to bring a wrongful 
death claim in Maryland against the NCAA due to its relationship with 
Maryland.  However, because the NCAA has not voluntarily undertaken the 
duty to oversee and control the actions of its member-institutions, it is unlikely 
the NCAA would be liable for McNair’s death. 
Additionally, a tortfeasor is liable for the deceased’s injury or death as long 
as the injury was within the scope of the danger of the activity.122  However, 
when there are intervening forces, this chain of causation can be broken if the 
action taken is not reasonably foreseeable and outside of the normal activity.123  
Here, it is unclear whether the likelihood of the athletic training staff failing to 
follow proper protocol regarding this kind of injury was foreseeable,124 and 
assuming the Maryland athletic training staff regularly followed protocol, it 
would be difficult to prove the NCAA would be liable for their wrongful actions 
(i.e., failure to provide adequate cooling and diagnosis of McNair’s exertional 
heat stroke symptoms)125 because Maryland had implemented a plan for the 
prevention of heat stroke that utilizes the best practices indicated by the NCAA 
including assessment of heat stroke risk factors and emergency care for 
exertional heat stroke.126  The university acknowledges the failure of the athletic 
and medical staff to properly diagnose and treat McNair’s symptoms as well as 
the delay in contacting emergency medical services, but it would appear 
McNair’s death was preventable.127  Furthermore, it would be unforeseeable 
Maryland would fail to comply with its own exertional heat stroke prevention 
plan.  Therefore, even if the NCAA had a duty to protect its student-athletes, it 
would be unlikely for the NCAA to be liable.  
Even though a court would likely find Maryland to be liable for Jordan 
McNair's death due to Maryland’s special relationship with its student-athletes, 
it is unlikely that a court would find the NCAA to be liable for the death because 
the NCAA has not voluntarily undertaken the duty to protect its student-athletes, 
and it is not reasonably foreseeable that McNair’s death would have occurred. 
 
121. Kirshner, supra note 20; see Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 62–64 (observing the staff 
failed to provide the necessary and proper medical and safety equipment for football conditioning, failed to 
provide immediate and aggressive cooling to McNair, failed to provide acclimatization, failed to follow 
emergency protocol, etc.). 
122. Copsey v. Park, 160 A.3d 623, 637 (Md. 2017). 
123. Id. at 639. 
124. Talia Richman, What We Learned from University of Maryland Football Culture Report After Jordan 
McNair’s Death, BALT. SUN, Oct. 26, 2018, https://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/terps/tracking-the-
terps/bs-md-maryland-football-takeaways-20181025-story.html (providing the toxic culture was not directly 
responsible for the McNair's death but the dysfunction was rampant within the athletic department as a whole). 
125. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 63–64. 
126. Id. at 16. 
127. Maese & Stubbs, supra note 3. 
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C. NCAA Liability in Indiana 
Because the NCAA is headquartered in Indiana, an assessment of whether 
the NCAA could be liable under the Indiana wrongful death statute would be 
helpful.  Courts, in Indiana, apply the law where the tort incurred unless there 
are no “significant contacts” to apply that state’s law.128  Generally, the place 
where the wrongful act took place is significant and considered to be the place 
with the most significant contacts,129 and Indiana applies the traditional “lex loci 
delicti” rule, which means that the law of the state where the wrong took place 
applies.130  However, if that is not the place the tort occurred, other contacts with 
the state of Indiana are utilized to determine whether Indiana law will be 
applied.131  Indiana’s choice-of-law for tort action incurred outside of the state 
is analyzed by the substantial contacts test considering “(1) the place [or places] 
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2) the residence or place of 
business of the parties; and (3) the place where the relationship is centered.”132  
This list is not exclusive but any contacts should be “evaluated according to their 
relative importance to the particular issue[] being litigated.”133   For Indiana law 
to be applied, the contacts must clearly indicate that the alleged tort and its 
parties were connected to the state.134 
First, the court would assess where the injury occurred to determine whether 
significant contacts exist.135  The relevant conduct is defined as the “last 
significant act” in which the injury occurred.136  It is undisputed that the conduct 
resulting in McNair’s death occurred in the state of Maryland, not Indiana.137  
Because McNair’s death occurred in Maryland, the place of the tort is not 
connected to Indiana—meaning this factor favors Maryland.138  Therefore, the 
place in which the tort incurred does not bear much weight in this case.139  The 
 
128. Simon v. U.S., 341 F.3d 193, 199 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
129. Id. at 198–99. 
130. Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. 2004). 
131. Id. (finding the presumption that the state in which the wrong took place is not indisputable); see 
Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987) (finding if the state with the most significant 
contacts is another state, the court must consider the parties’ related actions in those states). 
132. Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806; see also 12 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317 (2019). 
133. Simon, 341 F.3d at 198-99 (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1073). 
134. See Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1074 (finding that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied 
Illinois law because all three factors indicated there were significant contacts with the state of Indiana). 
135. Simon, 341 F.3d at 200. 
136. Id. at 204; see also Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1073. 
137. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 25. 
138. See Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1074. 
139. Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. 2004) (finding the place of the tort to be insignificant 
because the tort occurred outside of Indiana and none of the involved parties were Indiana residents). 
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second factor to consider is the place of residence or place of business.140  The 
NCAA is headquartered in Indiana, which indicates Indiana as its principle 
place of business;141  however, because the Maryland staff conducted the 
wrongful action in the state of Maryland, this factor does not clearly favor 
Maryland or Indiana.142  Thirdly, the center of the parties’ relationship is not 
entirely clear because there are no indications that McNair and the NCAA were 
ever within the same state143 nor are there any indications that Maryland 
frequently visited Indiana.144  Therefore, the third factor does not clearly favor 
either forum.  While the NCAA is currently headquartered in Indiana, the other 
involved parties are not Indiana residents.  Because it is unlikely for Indiana’s 
law to govern this tort action, it is unnecessary to do a full analysis of Indiana’s 
wrongful death statute to determine whether the NCAA could be held liable in 
Indiana. 
D. Suggestion 
NCAA has received ample knowledge about the dangers regarding 
exertional heat stroke; therefore, it seems that it would be imperative for an 
affirmative duty to be placed upon the NCAA comparable to that imposed on 
the NCAA to prevent concussions.145  Eric Breece, the NCAA’s Coordinator of 
Championships and Alliances, has stated it is wrong for a student-athlete to get 
seriously injured while competing or practicing for a member-institution if the 
injury could have been reasonably prevented by safety precautions.146  But it 
appears that despite this statement, the NCAA as an association has not 
affirmatively asserted any right of control over the treatment of student-athletes’ 
healthcare at any of their member-institutions because the Sports Medicine 
Handbook produced by the NCAA only provides guidance for the member-
institutions147 and the NCAA Manual gives the duty of student-athlete health 
and safety to its member-institutions.148  The Sports Medicine Handbook 
specifically states it only provides guidelines—not mandatory rules or 
 
140. Simon, 341 F.3d at 199. 
141. Id. at 205.  
142. Id. at 199 (finding where the parties have different places of businesses, this factor does not indicate 
one state’s jurisdiction over another). 
143. Id.  
144. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987) (finding recurrent visits to Indiana 
to conduct business was sufficient to indicate the application of Indiana law). 
145. See generally SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13 (providing multiple references to the 
dangers related to heat-related strokes).  
146. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
147. Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 173 (D.D.C. 2017). 
148. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3. 
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regulations—for member-institutions to help create appropriate sports medicine 
policies of their own.149  Therefore, the NCAA has not affirmatively and 
voluntarily undertaken the responsibility of ensuring member-institutions abide 
by these guidelines to protect their student-athletes safety.150  Instead, the 
responsibility is deferred to the member-institutions.151  
This deferment appears to be antithetical to the commitment described in 
the Manual because it seems counterintuitive to “commit” oneself to the health 
and safety of student-athletes but fail to create mandatory regulations to ensure 
health and safety.  For example, almost 4.5 million current and former student-
athletes of member-institutions sought a class action suit against the NCAA 
asserting the NCAA’s failure to provide adequate guidelines for concussion-
management to protect student-athletes.152  This class asserted that this failure 
on the part of the NCAA put them more at risk for subsequent concussions.153  
In considering the proposed settlement, the court found determinations of 
whether the NCAA breached a duty to protects its student-athletes requires 
individual fact-based determinations regarding concussion-related risks because 
the nature and the extent of the applicable concussion protocols are essential to 
the plaintiffs’ claims against the NCAA, which largely vary depending on the 
actions taken by both the NCAA and the particular member-institution.154  Thus, 
assumptions of the NCAA’s legal duty to protect student-athletes health are 
insufficient on their own to establish that NCAA liability nationwide even if the 
NCAA had a legal duty to know what every school was doing regarding 
concussions during the relevant period.155  While the settlement does not 
expressly acknowledge whether the NCAA had a duty to know what every 
member-institution was doing for all of its sports for concussion protocol,156 the 
court indicates a high degree of causation where there is a bodily injury class 
action depends on the rules, equipment, circumstances, and involved staff 
adopted for each individual sport.157  Therefore, due to the fact-intensive nature, 
it would be unlikely for a class action suit to span multiple sports and multiple 
 
149. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 12. 
150. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 174; Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 553.  
151. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2. 
152. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580, 584, 
593 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
153. Id. at 585. 
154. Id. at 594-95 (establishing individual actions would better suit the needs of the plaintiffs). 
155. Id. (refusing to find the NCAA had a duty to regulate and enforce safety rules upon its member 
institutions). 
156. Id. at 594. 
157.  In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 2492, 2016 
WL 3854603, *6, (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
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member-institutions.158  Instead, the governing law is from the state in which 
the wrongful act took place, which prohibits any nationwide personal injury 
class action suits.159 
It is evident from this class action settlement that there was such a broad 
variation among member-institutions’ implementations of concussion 
protocol.160  For example, some schools merely warned student-athletes about 
the risk of head injuries and concussion; whereas, some schools provided 
baseline testing for concussions in addition to warnings.161 Therefore, the court 
could not conclude that the class was injured in the same way.162  But it still 
appears to not be completely logical for the NCAA’s lack of duty to protect 
student-athletes when there is a complete lack of consistency of implementing 
concussion protocol across the different sports and all NCAA member-
institutions.163  The NCAA acknowledged the possible dangers of concussions 
in 1999 when they conducted a study examining the effects of concussions in 
former student-athletes who participated in football.164  Additionally, in an 
annual survey provided to the NCAA regarding football-related fatalities, 
concern with concussion and brain injury fatalities was of the utmost 
importance.165  Therefore, it is difficult to imagine why the NCAA, who has 
established a “commitment” to student-athlete health and safety, would fail to 
provide better protection to its student-athletes especially with twenty years of 
knowledge regarding the dangers of concussions and head injury.166  
Previous cases have generally ruled that the NCAA has no affirmative duty 
to protect the physical and mental health and safety of its student-athletes while 
student-athletes are participating in intercollegiate athletics despite producing 
policy and medical guidelines enacted for the protection of student-athletes.167  
 
158. Id. 
159. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. at 596. 
160. Id. at 593. 
161. Id. at 593-94. 
162. Id. at 595. 
163. Id. at 594. 
164. Brian Burnsed, NCAA Funds Study Examining the Long-Term Effects of Concussions in Sports, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/ncaa-funds-study-examining-long-term-effects-
concussions- sports (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
165. See generally KUCERA, supra note 28. 
166. See Burnsed, supra note 164. 
167. See Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 249 F.Supp.3d 149, 168 (D.D.C. 2017) (rejecting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss because it was not completely clear the defendant’s actions were not negligent 
nor resulting from a duty); see also McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp.3d 732, 740 
(M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding the NCAA did not partake in specific, affirmative conduct to render a voluntary 
undertaking to protect student-athlete educational opportunities); see also Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
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Similarly to the concussion settlement where the NCAA lacked a duty to enforce 
uniform concussion protocol in an effort to better protect student-athletes from 
head trauma, the NCAA has no duty to know and enforce every member 
institution’s plan regarding exertional heat stroke.168  Even though the duty of 
the health and safety of student-athletes does not fall to the NCAA but rather to 
each member-institution, it would seem counter-intuitive that the NCAA as a 
whole does not have any kind of affirmative duty to ensure compliance, which 
was reiterated in the concussion settlement.169   
This seemingly antithetical finding of the courts applies equally to both 
concussion protocol and exertional health and safety.  The NCAA Manual 
establishes NCAA commitment to student-athlete well-being by establishing an 
environment that fosters safety between the student-athletes and the member-
institutions’ representatives.170  But is it really committed to student-athlete 
health and safety when the NCAA has failed to implement policies and 
procedures that actually protect student-athlete health and safety, especially in 
the case of concussion protocol and exertional heat stroke?  The NCAA’s lack 
of liability despite their apparent “commitment” to student-athlete well-being is 
nonsensical when there is a well-documented risk of athletes experiencing 
exertional heat stroke as well as complications as a result of brain injuries or 
concussions.171  Similarly, it is known and therefore foreseeable that 
concussions and head trauma can result in chronic traumatic encephalopathy 
(CTE), depression, lowered cognitive functioning, etc.,172 and as a result of this 
knowledge, the NCAA implemented its “Concussion Safety Protocol” 
following the concussion litigation requiring involvement from the NCAA 
regarding the implementation of each member-institution’s concussion safety 
protocol.173  This change potentially created an affirmative duty to help member-
institutions in ensuring concussion safety by the NCAA.174  However, unlike the 
potential duty created by the implementation of the Concussion Safety Protocol, 
a similar rule had not been launched by the NCAA for exertional heat stroke.  
 
Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding the plaintiff failed to illustrate that the NCAA owed 
a duty to their student-athletes).  
168. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 173. 
169. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3. 
170. Id. at “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model.” 
171. See Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 4; SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 56–
57 (Aug. 2014). KUCERA, supra note 28, at 11–12 (providing a multitude of recommendations and sources to 
create proper concussion protocol for football programs). 
172. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421 (3rd Cir. 2016); In 
re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580, 593 (N.D. Ill. 
2016). 
173. See generally NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 3, 3.2.4.18.1. 
174. See Schmitz v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 67 N.E.3d 852, 867–68 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
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According to experts, exertional heat stroke is survivable when the person is 
cooled down to below 104 degrees.175  As indicated in the NCAA's Sports 
Medicine Handbook, there are several ways the NCAA outlined to both identify 
and prevent exertional heat stroke in student-athletes,176 but because the 
NCAA’s handbook is only meant to provide guidelines for its member-
institutions, there is no duty of care required of the NCAA beyond a duty to 
provide its member-institutions with health and safety information for its 
student-athletes.  The only mention of any heat-related injuries or strokes is in 
the requirement of member-institutions to report any “student-athlete 
catastrophic fatalities, near fatalities and catastrophic injuries”177 annually to the 
NCAA.  This regulation does not require any member-institutions to take any 
particular action regarding the implementation of an NCAA safety protocol for 
exertional heat stroke.178  However, the lack of duty and regulation does not 
make sense, especially considering the foreseeability of complications due to 
improper diagnosis of exertional heat stroke in student-athletes—especially 
those competing in warm temperatures—or a complete failure to diagnose 
exertional heat stroke like in Jordan McNair’s case.179 
Due to the knowledge regarding heat stroke, the NCAA should 
affirmatively accept the same kind of duty for exertional heat stroke based both 
on the knowledge available and the potential for detrimental health risks 
associated with exertional heat stroke as it did with concussions.  As it is 
currently, the NCAA only has duties to guide and inform member-institutions 
and their student-athletes about health and safety risks,180 but due to the 
detrimental and preventable health risks concerning heat stroke when not 
properly diagnosed and treated, the NCAA should deliberately create a duty to 
ensure the safety of its athletes by insuring its member-institutions comply with 
protocol.  The NCAA had outlined numerous risk factors including dehydration, 
improper acclimatization, high heat and humidity combination, and the intensity 
of exercise; these risk factors are indications that exertional heat stroke would 
be foreseeable if the risk factors are met.181  Additionally, according to research, 
an extremely high percentage of people cooled to the proper temperature within 
 
175. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 6. Melissa Block, Researching Heatstroke in Athletes, NPR 
(Aug. 26, 2018, 8:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/26/642008040/researching-heatstroke-in-athletes. 
176. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39–40. 
177. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 3, 3.2.4.19. 
178. See id.  
179. KUCERA, supra note 28, at 14. Block, supra note 175 (explaining that due to student-athletes’ lack 
of power, the NCAA has the responsibility to ensure injuries like complication with heat stroke can no longer 
occurring any sport including football). 
180. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
181. See generally SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 41-42. 
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thirty minutes of exhibiting heat stroke symptoms survived heat stroke.182  
Therefore, it would be a disgrace and an antithesis to the commitments outlined 
in the NCAA Manual for the NCAA not to do everything in its power to ensure 
student-athletes are competing in a safe environment.183  In the words of Eric 
Breece, the NCAA’s Coordinator of Championships and Alliances, “‘any 
serious injury’ at an NCAA event ‘is unacceptable if reasonable safety measures 
could prevent’ the injury.”184 
V. CONCLUSION 
The tragedy of Jordan McNair’s death as a result of heat stroke while 
practicing for the University of Maryland football team should not have 
occurred.  Numerous mistakes were made by the athletic training staff including 
failure to properly diagnose and treat McNair’s exertional heat stroke, failure to 
acclimate McNair after a four-week break, lack of immediate cooling, and 
failure to promptly call 9-1-1.185  This incident is one that has shocked millions 
of people across the country, and in light of the horrors surrounding other recent 
athletic institutions’ missteps, it is one that will be scrutinized closely.  While 
there is no way of knowing definitively how the lawsuit is going to turn out, one 
thing is for certain: currently, the NCAA is unlikely to have a duty to ensure and 
protect the health and safety of its student-athletes because that duty lies solely 
on each member-institution and the NCAA has not deliberately and voluntarily 
undertaken that duty.  It is the harsh truth; however, it only takes one incident 
to turn the tide.  While it is confusing and maybe even despicable that the NCAA 
lacks a duty to protect the well-being of the student-athletes at its member-
institution, this case could potentially implement a duty to ensure that its 
member-institutions are properly following protocol especially concerning a 
medical stroke that could have been easily remedied. 
 
182. Block, supra note 175; KUCERA, supra note 28, at 15. 
183. NCAA, supra note 24, at “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model.” 
184. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 543. 
185. See generally Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 62-66. 
